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Shame, stigma, HIV: 
philosophical reflections
Phil Hutchinson,1 Rageshri Dhairyawan2
AbStrAct 
It is a distinctive feature of HIV that its 
pathology cannot be adequately grasped 
separate from a number of psychosocial 
factors, and stigma is widely seen as the 
most prominent. We argue that it is equally 
important to have an adequate understanding 
of shame, as the emotional response to 
stigma. We have identified five ways shame 
might negatively impact upon attempts to 
combat and treat HIV, which emerge from the 
stigma HIV carries and STI-stigma in general. 
In this paper, we draw out four insights from 
philosophical work on emotions and shame 
which we propose will improve understanding 
of shame and stigma. We conclude by briefly 
discussing how these insights might shed light 
on the negative role shame can play for a 
person living with HIV engaging with, or being 
retained in, care. We conclude by proposing 
further study.
It is a distinctive feature of HIV that its 
pathology cannot be adequately grasped 
separate from a number of psychosocial 
factors, and stigma is the most prominent 
of these. Of the literature on the topic of 
HIV stigma, Parker and Aggleton1 have 
produced arguably the most influential 
recent work, in which they argue for a 
hybrid social theory of stigma, which 
while indebted to Goffman’s classic study 
of stigma, seeks to augment this by 
drawing on Foucault’s analysis of power. 
We propose, with qualifications, that the 
present paper be seen as a critical 
companion piece to Parker and Aggleton’s 
paper. Where their focus is on stigma, 
ours is on shame. Where they are 
concerned to enrich understanding of 
stigma in the context of HIV, so we seek to 
do likewise with shame.
However, here is where we would wish 
to qualify our endorsement of Parker and 
Aggleton’s paper: First, we propose that 
to examine stigma without also examining 
shame is to miss much of importance; 
it is akin to studying ‘threats’ as a social 
phenomenon, while ignoring the fear 
people have in response to those threats. 
Second, while the thrust of Parker and 
Aggleton’s argument is well taken and 
important, it fails to get to the important 
conceptual questions, because it remains at 
the level of social theory. We argue below 
that philosophical reflection on shame can 
offer significant gains, which can inform 
effective strategies for care. Such gains 
are to be found below the philosophical 
waterlinei and serve to frame more overtly 
empirical and theoretical considerations 
of emotion, shame and stigma. Our paper 
aims to be a reminder that mitigating, 
and where possible dissolving, conceptual 
confusion through philosophical work is 
crucial if one is to do good psychological 
and sociological work.
We have identified five ways in which 
shame might negatively impact upon 
attempts to combat and treat HIV, which 
emerge from the stigma HIV carries and 
STI-stigma in general.
1. Shame can prevent an individual from 
disclosing all the relevant facts about 
their sexual history to the clinician.
2. Shame can serve as a barrier to 
engaging with or being retained in 
care.
3. Shame can prevent individuals 
presenting at clinics for STI and HIV 
testing.
4. Shame can prevent an individual from 
disclosing their HIV (or STI) status to 
new sexual partners.
5. Shame makes people want to hide and 
withdraw from the world and others, it 
therefore makes the task of living with 
HIV a far more negative experience 
than it should, or needs to, be.
In concluding this paper, and by way 
of example, we will focus on No. 2. We 
will propose that our four insights, gained 
i What we intend to draw out by employment of 
this metaphor is the extent to which philosophy 
is non-theoretical activity of conceptual clarifi-
cation and dissolving of conceptual confusions. 
This is work that needs to be done, and which 
cannot be bypassed by simply producing more 
theory or doing more empirical work. To do 
this work, one must dip below the philosoph-
ical waterline.
from philosophical work on emotions and 
shame, provide guidance for future study 
of the negative role shame might play for 
a person living with HIV engaging with or 
being retained in care.
PHIloSoPHIcAl reflectIon on 
emotIonS And SHAme
Explanations of emotion fall in to one of 
two philosophical camps. Those whose 
work falls within the paradigm initiated 
by the 19th-century philosopher, psychol-
ogist and physician William James, are 
referred to as Jamesians.ii In short, you 
are a Jamesian if you argue that emotions 
are essentially physiological responses to 
causal stimuli, and the awareness of these 
responses. Emotion as affect.
In opposition, one finds the cognitivists, 
a position in the philosophy of emotions 
traceable back to the Stoic movement 
in Ancient Greece, but with contempo-
rary adherents in contemporary cogni-
tive psychology, ecological cognition and 
postanalytic philosophy. You are a cogni-
tivist if you argue that emotions are essen-
tially thoughts about, or directed towards, 
something in the world. Emotion as 
(embodied) thought.iii
One could advance one of many psycho-
logical or sociological theories of emotion 
without referring to either of these two 
underlying philosophical positions, but 
in doing so, in advancing your theory, 
you will commit to one of them, and this 
commitment would then constrain you. 
One is so constrained because whether 
acknowledged or not, these philosophical 
commitments will be operative in one’s 
theorising.
This philosophical dispute has conse-
quences for addressing, or treating 
emotions, where they present difficulties. 
If we conceive of emotions as essentially 
physiological changes triggered by causal 
stimuli in the environment, our focus will 
be on understanding the causal mecha-
nisms, and perhaps preventing the cause. 
On this view, the person experiencing the 
emotion is subject to that emotion, the 
emotions can be depicted as ‘passions’ and 
a person who is in an emotional state is 
passive.
Depicting the emotions as passions leads 
us to depict the person having the emotion 
as akin to a stimulus-response processor, 
ii This is sometimes referred to as the James-
Lange theory, because the Danish physiologist 
Carl Lange arrived at the same theory at around 
the same time.
iii See Hutchinson16 for a more detailed over-
view of Jamesianism and Cognitivism.
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responding to certain causal inputs with 
certain outputs (emotional responses). 
While this has the virtue of being a natural-
istic depiction of emotion, it is somewhat 
at odds with the complexity of human 
psychology and mind–world relations; it 
also faces the somewhat difficult problem 
of accounting for the meaning emotions 
have for those experiencing them. On this 
view, we understand human emotional 
responses on the model of an artefact such 
as a smoke alarm responding to smoke in 
the environment.
If one is a cognitivist, the picture is 
different, a little more complex, and, we 
propose, more appropriate to our nature. 
Here, our emotions are meaningful 
responses to a world which we experience 
as having meaning for us, what in some 
philosophical contexts is referred to as the 
lifeworld. On this conception, emotions 
are no longer appropriately depicted as 
passions and the bearer of emotions is 
no longer necessarily passive but, rather, 
has scope for some emotional agency, for 
it is at least logically (or grammatically) 
possible to achieve control over one’s 
emotions, if not necessarily possible in 
practice, on specific occasions.
Within the cognitivist approach to 
explaining emotion there are a number 
of different sets of commitments one 
might have, which relate to the nature of 
the cognitive constituents one employs 
in the explanation. So, one might be a 
judgementalist (eg, Solomon2), where 
one depicts emotions as constituted and 
type individuated by judgements. Here 
one is also, therefore, committed to a 
representationalist picture of cognition, 
where the constituents of cognition are 
mental representations of the world, 
with propositional form. On this view, 
the emotion is a propositional attitude. 
So, where judgementalists identify the 
constituents of emotion as judgements, 
other philosophers identify the cognitive 
constituents as ‘thoughts’ (Nussbaum3), 
‘evaluative beliefs’ (Taylor4) or ‘construals’ 
(Roberts5); we can, therefore, refer to this 
group of emotion theorists as ‘proposi-
tional attitude cognitivists’ (Pro-Cogs), for 
they are all committed to the claim that 
the constituents of emotion are proposi-
tional attitudes. Pro-Cogs conceive the 
person as a belief (or judgement) machine, 
akin to software programmes running 
on hardware components, which output 
contentful information in response to 
certain patterned inputs.
In contrast, and at the other end of 
the cognitivist spectrum, we find those 
who forgo or reject representationalism, 
and depict emotions as a specific class 
of affordances or evaluative perceptions 
(eg, Hutchinson6). We call this version 
of cognitivism ecological cognition (Eco-
Cog), and the explanation becomes less 
theoretical and abstract and instead 
focused on persons who have gone 
through a process of enculturation, who 
inhabit a world which has meaning and 
contains loci of significance for them, 
given their enculturation (Bildung/Second 
Nature) and their particular interests.iv 
While this framework forgoes brevity 
and neatness, perhaps, we gain in under-
standing and explanatory power, for it is 
sensitive to the way in which the world 
has meaning, and the specific meaning it 
has for this person might be in response to 
that person’s enculturation and interests.
We here want to pick out two gains we 
believe arise from taking up the Eco-Cog 
perspective on emotion.v
1. An emotion is not conceived of as an 
affect (Jamesianism), nor is conceived 
of as constituted by beliefs (Pro-Cog). 
Rather, we conceive of emotion as a 
dynamic relation between, on the one 
hand, a person, who in addition to 
their biological constitution is endowed 
with a specific culture, and on the 
other hand, the lifeworld. This means 
that theoretical solutions will not cut 
it, because the generality of the theory 
will mean it is unable to capture the 
dynamism and occasion, context and 
cultural specificity of the relationship. A 
iv There is an ongoing discussion in Philosophy 
of Mind, Psychology and Cognitive Science, 
and which we report on here because it impacts 
directly on our conception of emotion; the 
argument is over whether cognition is essen-
tially representational. There is a tradition 
which has dominated for much of the last one 
hundred years in analytic philosophy, and in 
cognitive science for the last fifty years, which 
sees the constituents of cognition (thought) as 
essentially mental representations of the world, 
which have semantic content. In contrast, there 
are accounts which challenge this representa-
tionalist picture. These one can find in Ecolog-
ical and Enactivist accounts of cognition (eg, 
Gibson,17 Noe,18 and Hutto & Myin19) and 
Ethnomethodological accounts (eg, Coulter20). 
Such accounts often draw on philosophical 
work by Ludwig Wittgenstein and by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.
v For those who are familiar with Dan Moer-
man’s21 writing on meaning responses, those 
writings can be usefully seen as a companion 
to that which we propose here. Moerman 
argues that stimulus-response (Pavlovian condi-
tioning) and response-expectancy (belief and 
expectation) ‘explanations’ fail to explain the 
‘placebo response’, and in their place proposes 
a non-representationalist meaning response, 
which invokes our encultured nature.
theory of shame will fail to adequately 
capture the nature of the emotion. 
Rather, we must engage with the 
individuals experiencing the emotion 
and work to understand the way in 
which they relate to the world and how 
that brings them to the emotional state.
2. The approach we recommend 
overcomes the ‘problem of emotional 
recalcitrance’ (see D’Arms and 
Jacobson7 and Griffiths8), oft-cited 
as a reason to forgo Pro-Cog in 
favour of Jamesianism: an example of 
emotional recalcitrance being fear of 
flying, experienced while concurrently 
believing (correctly) that flying is the 
safest mode of transport. On the Eco-
Cog approach, belief is not playing the 
explanatory role which it plays in Pro-
Cog, so, we can retain the cognitivist 
insight without facing the problem 
of recalcitrance. This pays dividends 
when we turn our attention to shame, 
for it is a characteristic feature of shame 
that it is experienced in the absence 
of a set of beliefs that would serve to 
explain the shame. Indeed, often it is 
the converse: the beliefs held tell the 
person experiencing shame that they 
have no grounds for their shame, yet 
the shame persists.
emotIonS And tHeIr objectS: 
tHe World-dIrected nAture of 
emotIon
Cognitivist explanations of emotion depict 
emotions as object oriented: emotions 
have objects, and the conceptual analysis 
of emotion, by which we establish their 
identity criteria, includes these objects. 
On this account, shame’s object is status 
diminishment, of one’s self (one’s being), 
as an individual or as a member of a 
group. To be stigmatised, as an individual 
or member of a stigmatised group, is to be 
subject to such a diminishment in status. 
Shame is the emotional manifestation of 
such stigma. In philosophical terms, shame 
and stigma are internally related, for they 
are not related as two separate entities but 
are internal to the meaning and identity of 
each other.
Let us take some examples from the 
writings of Primo Levi, and his discussions 
of shame in If this is a Man9 and later in 
The Drowned and the Saved.10 We do so 
because, as we noted above, our analysis 
should be focused on people expressing 
and experiencing the emotions we are 
studying.
Primo Levi’s writings testify to a number 
of sources of status diminishment that give 
rise to shame:
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 ► Humanity was diminished because the 
crimes of Auschwitz had taken place: 
so humanity bore the stigmata engen-
dered by the crimes of the Holocaust 
(the bureaucratised and industrialised 
dehumanisation, mass murder and 
genocide). Levi’s shame testifies to 
this stigma.
 ► In addition, Levi felt diminished 
owing to the accident of survival. He 
experiences shame because survival 
was not connected to his worth as a 
person, because death and survival in 
Auschwitz were radically decoupled 
from one’s goodness or badness, or 
any discernible rationale, becoming 
a matter of chance, decided by the 
whim of a psychopath or perverse 
bureaucratic system. This dimin-
ishes the status of the individual, 
post-Auschwitz. It seems that for 
Levi his survival felt unearned, and 
while others died, this amounts to a 
diminishment.
 ► There also seems to be a dimin-
ishment which comes from a 
mismatch between how one acted in 
Auschwitz—even allowing for judging 
these as irreproachable in the context 
of the camp—and the standards one 
sets for oneself, or that are reason-
ably expected of one by one’s honour 
group, in the pre and post-Auschwitz 
context. Here, what is stigmatised is 
the person acting as they did in the 
camp, viewed from the perspective of 
the postcamp culture, and the recog-
nition that the viewer and viewed are 
the same person (or group).
There are a number of things that we can 
learn from these examples that are central 
to philosophical discussions of shame and 
that, we will argue, are relevant to HIV-re-
lated shame and stigma. We here want to 
focus on stigma-as-object-of-shame.
emotIonS And objectS
Our first observation is that while emotions 
have objects, these need not be concrete, 
but can be diffuse and abstract. The object 
of fear might well be the bear standing 
before us on the mountain path, though 
even here, it is our taking, our evaluative 
perception, of the bear-as-a-threat-to-our-
continued-wellbeing and the conceptual 
resources that draws upon, that consti-
tute it as an object of fear. However, this 
said, the object of our fear in this example 
is there before us in very real and literal 
sense. In contrast, we might also experi-
ence fear of failure, and here the object of 
fear is the idea of our failing to achieve 
that which is either expected of us by 
our peers or by ourselves. While the bear 
has a kind of concreteness and is directly 
perceived in the act of fearing, the future 
failure exists only as a possible future 
outcome, and as such is neither concrete 
nor directly perceptible.
Returning to shame; as we saw in the 
first example taken from Levi’s writ-
ings, what had become stigmatised was 
‘humanity,’ and Levi experiences shame 
as he acknowledges this, for his identity is 
in part constituted by his own humanity—
not only his membership of the species 
Homo sapiens, but how ‘humanity’ as a 
moral concept, what affords us the eval-
uative terms humane and inhumane, 
for example, features in our identity. 
Humanity is stigmatised owing to the 
crimes of the Holocaust and individual 
members of humanity experience shame 
in acknowledging this stigma and their 
membership of the stigmatised group.
So here is gain 3:
3. Objects can be concrete, simple and 
directly perceived or diffuse, complex and 
indirectly conceived. If the unfolding of 
history can stigmatise the very concept 
of humanity bringing shame for Holo-
caust survivors like Levi, then this tells us 
something about how some acts become 
stigmatised over time, through political 
change, for example, and lead to shame 
where there was none before.
SHAme, Honour GrouPS, Autonomy 
And Heteronomy
Discussions of the role of audience or 
honour group have been prominent in 
philosophical work on shame5 7 17 and the 
related question as to whether shame is an 
essentially heteronomous or autonomous 
emotion (eg, refs. 6 11–13). The ques-
tion is this: does the negative evaluation 
of others, taking the role of audience or 
honour group, play an essential role in the 
emergence of an individual’s shame? If 
one answers ‘yes,’ then one is implying in 
that answer that shame is heteronomous: 
shame is dependent on the judgement 
of others. If one answers ‘no,’ then one 
allows that shame can be autonomous: 
shame is not dependent on the judgement 
of others. This question cuts to the heart 
of how we might address shame.
Shame can appear to be characteristi-
cally heteronomous, as we see in the kind 
of shame that an individual experiences 
when they have fallen short of some soci-
etal standard. Consider the third in the 
list of shame experiences we find in Levi’s 
writings. Here Levi experienced shame 
because his actions in Auschwitz did not 
meet the standards expected of individuals 
in post-Auschwitz, post-War, European 
society. This is an example of heterono-
mous shame, because the shame emerges 
from the mismatch between a standard 
which is external to the individual, which 
resides in an actual audience evaluating 
the individual’s action or in a social rule 
or norm. Both actual audience and social 
norm provide a standard against which 
the person’s status is diminished.
Alternatively, one might argue that 
shame is essentially autonomous, where 
shame comes from a mismatch between 
one’s prevailing assumptions about one’s 
own character and the more consid-
ered, honest, reflective judgements made 
about that character. We might seek to 
project an image of our character as 
morally upstanding, caring and sharing. 
But, when we take time to reflect, when 
we are honest with ourselves about the 
totality of our behaviour over time, we 
see a mismatch and we see we are not the 
person we assumed ourselves to be and 
who we sought to project to others. This 
is an example of autonomous shame.
This discussion has persisted in the phil-
osophical literature on shame because it 
cuts to the heart of our moral psychology. 
From the perspective of (modern) morality, 
if shame were to be essentially heterono-
mous then it can play no significant role in 
an individual’s moral psychology, because 
to be a moral agent demands that one act 
on one’s own moral judgements, even 
when these are at odds with the judge-
ments of the honour group or established 
social norms. If shame is to be an emotion 
worthy of a place in analyses of our moral 
psychology then it cannot merely track the 
dominant social attitudes.
We draw on Hutchinson’s6 arguments to 
propose that shame can appear to operate, 
from case to case, either autonomously 
or heteronomously, but that ultimately 
the distinction collapses. For a person to 
take an event as shameful is for them to 
have read it as such, for it to have had 
that meaning for them. That person, this 
individual, has acknowledged the event 
as shameful. Looked at this way, shame 
meets the criteria for being autonomous.
However, there are certain enabling 
conditions that are required for this 
autonomy. The world has meaning for 
individuals because individuals go through 
processes of enculturation, which include 
the learning of a (public) language; in 
turn, learning a language is to learn to 
register, acknowledge and communicate 
the loci of significance in our world. In 
this sense, we can see the heteronomous 
sources of shame. The event is shameful 
because it has that meaning for us. It has 
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that meaning in virtue of our reading it 
this way and thereby seeing it as shameful. 
What enables our reading of the world 
in this way, seeing it under this aspect, is 
our second nature—our character—which 
is formed in and through our life with 
others.
While shame is intimately related to our 
social, encultured nature, it is therefore a 
mistake to assume this makes it necessarily 
heteronomous in a way which disqualifies 
it from having moral significance. Under-
standing that shame is not necessarily 
heteronomous, but can be autonomously 
arrived at should not be to deny that the 
social sources of our enculturation, the 
development of our moral character, serve 
as enabling conditions for our life with 
shame.
Shame can be heteronomous, such 
that shame is an acknowledgement, a 
taking-on-board, of the judgements (or 
morally loaded perceptions) of others 
about one’s self, and in so doing consid-
ering oneself, one’s being, to be in some 
way evaluatively diminished. While shame 
can also be autonomous, such that shame 
serves as testament to a mismatch between 
the sense of self one assumes and seeks 
to project to others and the self that one 
considers oneself to be on reflection.
Insisting it must be one or the other has 
consequences: if one holds that shame is 
always autonomous, then that will lead 
one to focus any attempt to alleviate shame 
solely on the psychology of the individuals 
who bear shame. Conversely, if one were 
to assume that shame is always heterono-
mous, then that will lead one to identify 
that which is in need of change as being 
the social norms of which the honour 
group (the shame-instantiating audience) 
are an embodiment. In this latter, heteron-
omous sense, addressing shame might be a 
political, cultural and social task, in addi-
tion to being a psychological task. This is 
our fourth gain.
4. We propose that addressing and 
treating shame can be, and often is, a 
political, cultural and psychological task.
Staging Post: four Insights from 
Philosophical Work on emotions and 
Shame
Let us here summarise our four gains, 
which we believe emerge when one dips 
below the philosophical waterline and 
engages with the philosophy of emotion 
and shame.
1. Emotional responses should be 
understood from the perspective of 
Ecological Emotional Cognition, as 
having the structure of a dynamic 
relation between an encultured 
individual with interests and the 
constitution of the lifeworld as a 
world of meanings and affordances. 
Theoretical accounts will not work. 
We must engage with the individuals 
experiencing the emotion and work 
with them to understand the way in 
which they relate to their world and 
how that brings them to the emotional 
state.
2. The Eco-Cog approach has the 
resources to make sense of someone 
having an emotion, while concurrently 
believing their emotion unwarranted. 
This is a characteristic feature of 
shame, where often the person expe-
riencing shame believes there are no 
grounds for their shame.
3. Emotions have objects, but these 
objects need not be simple, concrete 
nor directly perceptible. Shame’s 
object is stigma, and the stigma can 
take the form of a diffuse, complex 
of attitudes, which are taken not via 
perceptual capacities but which might 
be conveyed by such things as concep-
tual metaphor and familiar objects 
having gained new symbolic status.
4. At one level, shame experiences 
might be either heteronomous or 
autonomous, depending on the 
particular experience. At a deeper 
level, shame is the product of an 
individual’s evaluative taking of loci 
of significance in the lifeworld, which 
in turn are enabled by that individual’s 
enculturation. We propose that 
responding to shame will therefore 
demand political change in addition to 
work on the individual’s psychological 
health.
Shame, Stigma and HIV: retention in 
care
HIV serves as a vector through which pass 
many of a society’s existing prejudices. It 
is this that we identify as HIV-stigma. The 
shame experienced by some people living 
with HIV has as its object HIV-stigma. 
HIV-stigma can emerge from many 
sources, which track wider social attitudes. 
Since HIV is widely thought of as a sexu-
ally transmitted infection, HIV-stigma can 
draw upon prejudicial and other negative 
attitudes to sex and sexuality; where atti-
tudes prevail that identify certain sexual 
acts as normal, and others as abnormal or 
perverse, certain sexualities as normal and 
others as abnormal or perverse, the latter 
become stigmatised. HIV-stigma might 
even be related to attitudes about the 
appropriate amount of sex or number of 
sexual partners an individual should have, 
and perhaps this in turn invokes further 
gendered prejudice. Certain groups within 
society might have come to be more readily 
associated with HIV than are others and 
existing prejudices regarding these groups 
might therefore become associated with 
an HIV diagnosis.
Our focus on existing prejudices 
regarding sex and sexuality should not 
lead us to overlook the extent to which 
HIV-stigma might sometimes draw upon 
HIV’s status as a chronic illness (at least 
in those places where Anti-Retroviral 
Therapy (ART) is readily available), 
and how living with chronic illness and 
the consequent dependence on health 
resources can lead to various sources of 
stigma: stigma associated with society’s 
emphasis on good health, on autonomy, 
where your dependency on health services, 
on medication and the constant reminder 
that you do not have good health, can 
serve to stigmatise. The stigma might even 
emerge from metaphors widely employed 
to talk about viral infection, which intro-
duce by stealth negative moral appraisals. 
Here, as we comment elsewhere,14 the 
question ‘are you clean?’ asked of a friend 
might well have been innocent and meant 
no intentional stigmatisation, but the 
effect might serve to provide an object for 
shame.
Currently, as there is no known cure for 
HIV, successful treatment of HIV involves 
taking antiretroviral medication daily for 
the rest of an individual’s life (adherence), 
and attending HIV services regularly 
(retention in care). This is known to be 
challenging in many chronic diseases, such 
as diabetes and hypertension, where good 
adherence is thought to be >60% of drug 
doses taken correctly; it is even more chal-
lenging in HIV, where in order to avoid 
drug resistance >95% of drug doses need 
to be taken correctly.
Episodic treatment interruptions cause 
problems. First, there is some evidence 
to suggest that they increase drug resis-
tance, where a person whose ART 
regimen is interrupted responds less well 
to their ARVs as a result. Second, breaks 
from treatment increase the chance of a 
patient’s health deteriorating, their devel-
oping clinical AIDS or even of their death. 
The SMART (Strategies for Management 
of Antiretroviral Therapy) trial, involving 
just short of 5500 volunteers in 33 coun-
tries comparing continuous with episodic 
treatment of HIV, was stopped early as 
it became clear that patients following 
episodic treatment were at twice the risk 
of developing clinical AIDS.15 While treat-
ment in many countries has improved 
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since the SMART trial ended in 2006, 
this cannot be claimed to be the case glob-
ally; the results of the trial are relevant 
for many people living with HIV. Third, 
breaks in treatment can lead to spikes in 
viral load and therefore much greater risk 
of onward transmission.
While there are many possible factors 
that might lead to the interruption of care, 
from physical barriers, socioeconomic 
problems, and so on, the stigma associated 
with HIV, and the shame that emerges 
from this, are widely understood to be 
significant contributory factors in many 
decisions to stop or take a break from 
treatment, and it is this with which we are 
concerned here. What we here want to do, 
therefore, is twofold:
A. motivate the take-up of further study 
through which we might better 
understand the role shame and 
stigma play in the challenge posed to 
adherence and retention in care;
B. provide the conceptual resources so we 
that we can undertake sound research, 
employing methods appropriate to the 
nature of our topic: shame and HIV-
stigma.
While, from a narrowly conceived 
biomedical perspective, ART might well 
enable an individual to live a normal 
life, from a psychosocial perspective that 
same therapy—the taking of the pills, the 
attending clinic, the blood tests—might 
serve to continually remind the same 
person of their HIV status and the stigma 
associated with HIV. The very thing that 
biochemically suppresses the virus can 
serve, psychosocially, to generate stigma 
and shame.
How might this be Addressed?
Following the first of our four gains, we 
propose studies which enable our under-
standing of the shame experienced by 
people living with HIV, particularly those 
who have taken a break from treatment, 
so that we might better understand the 
objects of the emotion and the condi-
tions under which those objects ‘come 
into view.’ We propose that facilitating 
studies conducted by people living with 
HIV themselves, studies conducted in 
accordance with ethnographic principles 
and techniques provided by Ethnometh-
odology,vi would be the most productive 
approach.
vi Ethnomethodology, as an approach to social 
inquiry, is concerned with how social norms and 
rules are generated, maintained and repaired 
through the interaction and communication of 
members of society. Moreover, ethnographic 
descriptions of these interactions should give 
Following our second gain, treatment 
strategies designed to mitigate the effects 
of the emotion or eradicate it should not 
be based on explaining to a person that 
they have no good reason to be ashamed 
of their HIV status; those individuals will 
be likely to know this, they might even 
believe this strongly and be able to cite 
clear supporting reasons. Given what we 
know about the conceptual anatomy of 
shame, we need to address ourselves to 
the emotion at the subpropositional level.
Following our third gain, and following 
on from first and second, we might set 
about understanding the specific nature, 
the genesis and the conceptual anatomy 
of HIV-stigmas. The genesis will vary, but 
will be likely to have political sources in 
both intentional stigmatising practices, 
such as discriminatory laws, and acts 
of discrimination, and in unanticipated 
consequences of well-meaning interven-
tions such as public health messaging, 
which targets certain groups or practices. 
It is also likely that there will be residual 
structural stigmatisation, as the laws are 
repealed and the public health messaging 
improved, which resides in the metaphors 
still present in the language. Prejudicial 
language lingers long after prejudicial 
laws have passed into history and even 
after attitudes have largely changed. Such 
language can stigmatise. Again, ethnog-
raphies designed to identify the source, 
production and maintenance of stigma 
will bring forth the best insights here.
Our fourth gain serves to help us guard 
against the pathologising of those who 
experience shame. Their shame experi-
ence is often a response to the lifeworld 
and where support needs providing it 
should not be exclusively focused on the 
psychological health of the individual: we 
need to transform social practices where 
those serve to generate or perpetuate 
shame. It is important that psychological 
support is offered where it can be of help, 
but psychological support alone in the 
absence of the required political and soci-
etal changes amounts, overall, to a failure 
of support. Giving support in the shape of 
priority to the concepts employed by the partic-
ipants. The most effective way to ensure adher-
ence to these principles, so that we might gain 
an insight in the norms which govern the distri-
bution of stigma and shame within the social 
settings which people living with HIV inhabit, 
is to provide the resources so that people living 
with HIV can themselves produce ethnographic 
descriptions of, for example, a visit to the 
dentist, or the GP, or attending a new clinical 
setting. For further reading on Ethnomethod-
ology, see Garfinkel22 and Button (ed.)23
psychotherapy while leaving untouched 
the policy decisions that generate stigma is 
to take a crassly irresponsible approach to 
psychological well-being.
concluSIon
We have identified four insights that 
emerge from a philosophical work on 
emotions and shame. We have sought to 
relate these to the problem of HIV-stigmas 
and shame, as that impacts upon adher-
ence and retention in care for people 
living with HIV. Our proposal is that this 
work of philosophical reflection guides 
us in further approaches to much needed 
study.
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